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No. 20150241-CA  
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS  
__________________ 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
TRAVIS ROGER TULLEY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
__________________ 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
 
INTRODUCTION 
As required by Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(c), this reply brief is 
“limited to answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief.”  The brief 
does not restate arguments from the opening brief or address matters that do not 
merit reply. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court improperly excluded evidence of Larsen’s prior acts 
of sexual misconduct in violation of Tulley’s right to present a 
complete and believable defense. 
In his opening brief, Tulley demonstrated that Larsen’s prior acts of sexual 
misconduct were admissible under rules 404(b), 402, and 403. See Aplt. Br. 11-
20. Additionally, the court’s exclusion of this evidence was prejudicial. See id. at 
21-25. The State’s arguments to the contrary are not persuasive. 
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A. The misconduct evidence was relevant and admissible for a proper non-
character purpose under rules 402 and 404(b). 
Contrary to the State’s claims, Larsen’s prior misconduct was relevant and 
admissible for the non-character purpose of demonstrating Tulley’s state of mind 
as it relates to the reasonableness of his beliefs regarding self-defense. The 
misconduct was also relevant and admissible to show Larsen’s motive in sexually 
attacking Tulley. 
1.  The evidence was admissible to show Tulley’s state of mind vis-à-vis     
self-defense.  
Tulley argues that the evidence was admissible to show Tulley’s state of 
mind as it relates to the reasonableness of his beliefs regarding the use of force. 
See Aplt. Br. 14-16. The State counters that Larsen’s sexual misconduct “was 
irrelevant to [Tulley’s] self-defense claim and the reasonableness of his response” 
because: (1) it is “[Tulley’s] mental state—not the victim’s”—that is at issue, and 
(2) the misconduct evidence “did not [] make it more likely that [Larsen] groped 
[Tulley’s] genitals at knifepoint.” Aple. Br. 28. The State’s arguments miss the 
point. 
Tulley agrees that the essential component of a self-defense claim is the 
defendant’s—not the alleged victim’s—belief that force was necessary for self-
protection; it is Tulley’s beliefs that are at issue. But to the extent the State 
suggests that Larsen’s misconduct had no bearing on Tulley’s mental state, it is 
incorrect. As argued, an alleged victim’s prior acts “may reasonably ... color[] [a] 
defendant's attitude at the time of the encounter.” State v. Starks, 627 P.2d 88, 
3 
91 (Utah 1981); Aplt. Br. 14-15. That is, a defendant’s awareness of an alleged 
victim’s misconduct tends to shed light on his state of mind at the time of the 
incident, specifically, his reasonable apprehension of the alleged victim. And the 
degree to which the defendant feared the alleged victim is highly relevant to the 
jury’s assessment of the following: (1) whether the defendant’s use of force was 
reasonable, and (2) whether the amount of force he used was reasonable.   
In this case, Tulley’s knowledge that Larsen was a convicted rapist many 
times over was material to Tulley’s belief that he needed to use force to stop 
Larsen’s imminent sexual attack. Knowledge of Larsen’s prior misconduct also 
explained the severity of Tulley’s response. See Kelly v. State, 981 A.2d 547, 551 
(Del. 2009) (defendant’s knowledge of alleged victim’s 17 year old rape conviction 
was “[t]he critical fact …, which could explain both the nature and severity of [the 
defendant’s] response”). That is, a jury might find it reasonable for a defendant to 
use more force to halt an attack if the defendant’s reasonable apprehension of the 
alleged victim is great.  
Thus, where Tulley was aware of Larsen’s history of rape, see Aplt. Br. 15, 
the misconduct was relevant to show the reasonableness of Tulley’s beliefs 
regarding the use and amount of force necessary to curb Larsen’s imminent 
attack. While Larsen’s misconduct may not be admissible—as the State 
characterizes—for purposes of proving “that [Larsen] groped [Tulley’s] genitals at 
knifepoint,” Aple. Br. 28, the convictions were admissible to establish Tulley’s 
state of mind vis-à-vis self-defense. Tulley’s state of mind is a proper non-
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character purpose that does not require a propensity inference. See Starks, 627 
P.2d at 91; State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91, 96 (Utah 1982); see also, e.g., Jimmie E. 
Tinsley, 15 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 167 (2016) (when evidence of an alleged 
victim’s prior violent acts are offered to show the defendant’s “state of mind,” the 
evidence is not presented for propensity purposes, “but for the purpose of 
showing the defendant’s reasonable apprehension of danger in light of such … 
prior acts”); United States v. Saenz, 179 F.3d 686, 689 (9th Cir. 1999) (“extrinsic 
evidence concerning the victim's past violent acts is admissible under Rule 
404(b) to show defendant's state of mind”). 
2.  The evidence was admissible to show Larsen’s motive in 
perpetrating a sexual attack on Tulley. 
 The State also contends that the trial court erroneously concluded that the 
misconduct evidence was relevant to show Larsen’s “absence of mistake or 
motive and/or intent” in sexually attacking Tulley. Aple. Br. 22, 26-28. 
Specifically, it argues that “[u]sing [Larsen’s] prior sexual misconduct to explain 
why [Larsen] would sexually attack [Tulley] is simply a veiled propensity 
argument” and that Larsen’s “intent/motive was never disputed.” Id. at 27. The 
State is mistaken. 
Why Larsen would sexually attack Tulley—i.e. Larsen’s motive—was an 
issue that was disputed by the prosecution. See http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/motive (defining “motive,” as “something (as a need or 
desire) that causes a person to act”); State v. Morris, 122 P. 380, 382 (Utah 1912) 
(explaining motive can be defined as “the moving power which impels to action 
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for a definite result”). For instance, in closing, the State dismissed “[t]he idea that 
Wendell Larsen, a 71-year old man, [who] was very close with the defendant, who 
knows him, would try to rape a man of his age and stature. Kind of like trying to 
pull a porcupine out of a porcupine den, which is not a good idea.” R.1035. These 
statements demonstrate that Larsen’s motive was in dispute because they call 
into question why Larsen would be inclined to sexually attack a male friend. See 
Def. Ex. 1. 
 Moreover, evidence of Larsen’s sexual misconduct answers the “why” 
question. The misconduct shows that Larsen’s sexual attack on Tulley was 
motivated by deviant sexual desires, which manifested in the form of sexual 
attacks on males and females as well as sexual interest in his acquaintances. 
Offering the sexual misconduct evidence to demonstrate Larsen’s motive was a 
proper non-character purpose under rule 404(b). Accordingly, the trial court was 
within its discretion when it concluded that the evidence was admissible to show 
motive. 
B. The misconduct evidence was admissible under rule 403. 
Even though the strong probative value of the misconduct evidence was not 
substantially outweighed by its potential for prejudice, the State argues that the 
court properly excluded the evidence under rule 403. First, the State downplays 
the probative value of the misconduct, pointing out that the prior offenses were 
“dissimilar” and “remote[].” Aple. Br. 30-31. In doing so, it incorrectly assumes 
that the probative value of the misconduct evidence is limited to proving that 
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Larsen was the initial aggressor. See Aple. Br. 30 (arguing that “none of the acts 
… made it more likely than not” that Larsen would sexually attack Tulley). But the 
misconduct evidence was probative of much more. For one, its probative strength 
came from its tendency to show Tulley’s state of mind vis-à-vis self-defense. 
As argued, Tulley was aware that Larsen was a repeat sexual offender who 
had a long history that included acts against both sexes and recent acts against 
his sister. See Aplt. Br. 15, 18; supra Part I.A. The sexual misconduct evidence 
was therefore highly probative of the degree to which Tulley reasonably feared 
Larsen; whether he responded reasonably in using force; and whether the 
amount of force he used was reasonable. See Aplt. Br. 14-16; supra Part I.A. 
When the probative value of the misconduct evidence is considered in this light, 
“the significance of the … [time gap] between the incidents is greatly reduced.” 
State v. Cuttler, 2015 UT 95, ¶28, 367 P.3d 981; see also Aplt. Br. 17-18 (arguing 
that the probative value of older misconduct varies with the facts of the case and 
the purpose for which it is offered). 
While the probative value of a person’s remote act of sexual misconduct 
may be weaker if it is offered, for example, to prove that the person reoffended at 
a much later time (i.e. to prove actus reus), the same is not true if it is offered to 
show the defendant’s state of mind as it relates to self-defense. Indeed, when 
offered to show the defendant’s state of mind relative self-defense, the age of the 
misconduct matters little; what matters is whether the defendant in fact “knew” 
about the misconduct “at the time” of the incident. Howell, 649 P.2d at 97; see 
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also Starks, 627 P.2d at 91. Thus, in this case, what really matters is Tulley’s 
knowledge at the time of the alleged assault—knowledge that Larsen was a repeat 
sex offender against males and females and had continued that pattern of 
behavior by making unwanted sexual advances against his sister. Regardless of 
the age of the acts, the misconduct was highly probative of why Tulley would 
reasonably apprehend Larsen and therefore, why he acted reasonably in his 
application of force. That probative value was only made stronger by the fact that 
Larsen’s sexual misconduct was not isolated, but a lifelong pattern. See Aplt. Br. 
17-18. 
The State also claims that Larsen’s misconduct had “little probative value 
concerning [his] dissimilar conduct so many years later.” Aple. Br. 31. But again, 
the pattern of sexual misconduct displayed by Larsen and known by Tulley had 
strong probative value. The sum of the acts suggested that Larsen was sexually 
opportunistic and was capable of acting out against a variety of victims including 
women, underage girls and boys, and even his roommate in sex offender 
treatment. Additionally, there is nothing to suggest, as the State assumes, that the 
women and others he offended against “were apparently weaker than Mr. 
Larsen.” Aple. Br. 31. Considered as a whole, the acts were highly probative of 
Larsen’s sexually indiscriminate and deviant behavior, which shed light on why 
Larsen would attack Tulley. Likewise, Tulley’s knowledge of Larsen’s sexual 
ambivalence was strongly probative of the reasonableness of his apprehension of 
Larsen as well as his use of force. And for the reasons outlined, see Aplt. Br. 18-
8 
19, this strong probative value was not “substantially outweighed” by the dangers 
contemplated under rule 403. Utah R. Evid. 403. 
C. Exclusion of Larsen’s sexual misconduct prejudiced Tulley. 
Tulley has demonstrated that the court’s exclusion of the misconduct 
evidence was prejudicial. See Aplt. Br. 21-25. It is reasonably likely that Larsen’s 
prior sexual misconduct could have impacted the jury’s assessment of Tulley’s 
self-defense claim by making his story more believable. See id. at 22-23. 
Additionally, Tulley’s narrative was largely consistent with the evidence, and the 
State did not present evidence that convincingly disproved Tulley’s self-defense 
claim. See id. at 23-25. 
Nevertheless, the State first argues that the misconduct evidence “said 
nothing about whether [Tulley] responded with reasonable force.” Aple. Br. 34. 
But as argued, Tulley’s knowledge that Larsen was a convicted rapist explained 
why Tulley would be fearful of Larsen notwithstanding the fact that he was a 
weaker, elder adult. See Kelly, 981 A.2d at 551 (exclusion of the alleged victim’s 17 
year old rape conviction required reversal where the defendant claimed he acted 
in self-defense and the defendant was “a significantly larger man than [the 
victim]”). That fear informed the reasonableness of Tulley’s use of force as well as 
the “nature and severity of [his] response.” Id. For instance, the jury could have 
concluded that it would have been reasonable for Tulley to use greater force to 
halt the attack if his reasonable apprehension of Larsen was likewise great. In 
short, it is reasonably likely that the jury would have found it easier to accept 
9 
Tulley’s self-defense claim had the misconduct evidence been available for their 
consideration.   
Additionally, the State unconvincingly argues that the trial evidence “made 
it unlikely” that the jury would have found that Tulley “acted in self-defense even 
if [Larsen’s] sexual history w[as] admitted.” Aple. Br. 34. First, while the State 
emphasizes the commotion heard by Larsen’s neighbor, evidence of a commotion 
and “thumping” noises was not inconsistent with Tulley’s defense. Id. After 
observing Boren at Larsen’s front door, the neighbor subsequently closed her 
own door. R.639-40. It was not until the neighbor closed her own door that she 
heard the consistent thumping coming from the bathroom area. Id. And given the 
evidence that Boren entered Larsen’s apartment at some point, the jury could 
have concluded that at least some of the thumping was attributable to Boren’s 
activities—for instance, he perhaps made a commotion while trying to clean up 
the bathroom.1 Moreover, Tulley’s own testimony accounted for the sounds that 
the neighbor heard. Tulley testified: that he “pound[ed] [his] fists” in distress on 
the bedroom floor; that a bathroom area door twice went “boom”; and that he 
accidently dropped Larsen on the floor at least one time. R.959-61. Given this 
                                                 
1 Moreover, the neighbor testified that she ultimately retreated to her 
bedroom after confirming that an apartment complex employee had reported to 
Larsen’s door. R.640-41. She then heard more “loud” consistent “thumping.” Id. 
Because the neighbor did not witness who subsequently entered Larsen’s 
apartment, it is possible that some of the “loud” “thumping” was associated with 
Tulley’s apprehension or the tendering of aid to Larsen. 
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evidence, the jury could have concluded that the source of the thumping was 
something other than Tulley “beating” Larsen. See Aple. Br. 34-35. 
Additionally, contrary to the State’s suggestion, Larsen’s “injuries 
themselves” do not defeat Tulley’s self-defense claim. See Aple. Br. 35. Indeed, 
the defense’s medical expert testified that Larsen’s injuries were consistent with 
multiple punches to the face. R.862-63. The State’s medical expert likewise 
testified that Larsen’s injuries could be consistent with a couple of fist blows. 
R.630-31. The jury also heard evidence that as individuals age, their skin 
“becomes less resistant to various kinds of trauma.” R.863; see also R.629 
(State’s medical expert testifying that a younger patient would suffer less severe 
injuries). This supported an inference that because of Larsen’s age, Tulley’s 4-5 
punches caused him to suffer more acute injuries and more significant bleeding 
than a younger individual would suffer in a similar situation.  
Nor did the condition of the apartment undermine Tulley’s testimony that 
he punched Larsen 4-5 times in self-defense. The blood spatter in the bathroom 
can be explained by Tulley’s attempts to “flick[]” Larsen’s blood off of his hands. 
R.962. And the State did not refute this testimony by calling a bloodstain pattern 
expert. Moreover, the smeared blood is consistent with Boren’s testimony 
regarding his efforts to clean up the blood with a towel that he kept rinsing and 
wringing out. R.749-50, 761-62, 795-96, 799-800. Finally, Tulley—who was 
bloodied from attempting to help Larsen up—moved throughout the kitchen, 
11 
bedroom, and bathroom. R.961-65. Accordingly, it is likely that in his wake, he 
deposited blood in these places.   
II. Tulley should be granted a new trial because the jury was not 
instructed on the definition of forcible felony. 
In his opening brief, Tulley argues that the court committed error by failing 
to provide an “instruction identifying the sexual felonies that justified the use of 
deadly force.” Aplt. Br. 27. To be clear, Tulley does not allege that the error was 
the court’s failure to give defense counsel’s proposed self-defense instruction. See 
Aple. Br. 39; cf. Aplt. Br. 26-29. Rather, Tulley argues that the proposed 
instruction was sufficient to preserve the issue. See Aplt. Br. 31. But if not, Tulley 
maintains that this Court should review the issue for plain error. See Aplt. Br. 31-
32. The court’s failure to define “forcible felony” to include sexual felonies 
constituted error that should have been obvious. See Aplt. Br. 31-32. Additionally, 
that error was prejudicial. 
Nevertheless, the State argues that the error did not prejudice Tulley 
because his “self-defense theory rested entirely on having a knife held to his head, 
not a hand on his genitals.” Aple Br. 40. The State is incorrect.  
First, the State argues that through his testimony, Tulley “made it clear 
that he was defending himself against the knife and not the sexual abuse.” Aple. 
Br. 41. In doing so, it relies on the following testimony: 
And I remember waking up to that sensation. I looked over and I 
kind of started and I seen the knife right here in my head and I just 
started—started throwing my fists. I would probably say about four 
or five strokes. And as he backed out, his hand had removed from my 
phallus and my scrotum. 
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R.958. 
 The State’s reading of this testimony ignores the context and requires a 
parsing of the statement that the jury was unlikely to have engaged in. Tulley 
refers to waking up to a “sensation,” which the jury readily could have understood 
as a reference to the sensation resulting from Larsen’s hand on his “phallus and 
scrotum.” See id. Tulley then realized that Larsen also had a knife to his head and 
he punched Larsen, which caused Larsen’s hand to “remov[e] from [his] phallus 
and [his] scrotum.” Id. Based on this testimony, it is reasonably likely that the 
jury understood that Tulley threw the punches to defend himself not only against 
the knife, but also to prevent Larsen’s sexual advances.  
The State also argues that Tulley’s testimony “suggests he did not realize 
[Larsen’s] hand was on his genitals until after [Tulley] had thrown his punches.” 
Aple. Br. 41 (emphasis in original). This is a strained reading. Tulley testified that 
after he threw the punches, Larsen removed his hand from Tulley’s genitals. 
R.958. It does not make sense that Tulley would describe a sudden realization 
that Larsen’s hand was on his genitals in terms of Larsen “remov[ing]” his hand. 
Implicit in the word “remove” is a recognition that something once existed in a 
place (i.e. a hand on a person’s genitals), but then that something was “take[n] [] 
away from [that] place” or “no longer exist[s]” there. See http://www.merriam-
webster.com/remove. Accordingly, by using the word “remove,” Tulley implied 
an awareness that Larsen’s hand was already on his genitals. Thus, it is 
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reasonably likely that the jury understood that Tulley was aware of Larsen’s 
sexual advances prior to throwing the punches.  
In short, Tulley’s prevention of a sexual felony was critical to his self-
defense claim, particularly where police never located the knife that Tulley 
testified Larsen used. See Aplt. Br. 30-31. Therefore, the court’s failure to define 
forcible felony to include sexual felonies prejudiced Tulley. 
 Finally, the State argues that the error was “harmless” because “even if 
[Larsen] sexually abused [Tulley] at knifepoint,” “the overwhelming physical 
evidence and witness testimony” suggest that Tulley’s “use of force went well 
beyond that needed to defend himself.” Aple. Br. 42-43. But as explained, supra 
Part I.C, Larsen’s injuries, the condition of the apartment, and the evidence of 
“thumping” do not defeat Tulley’s self-defense claim. 
III. The aggravated abuse of a vulnerable adult statute contains 
unconstitutionally vague provisions. 
 On appeal, Tulley argues that subsections 76-5-111(1)(q)(i), (iii), and (iv) of 
Utah’s aggravated vulnerable adult abuse statute violate due process guarantees 
against vague criminal laws. See Aplt. Br. 32-43. Contrary to the State’s 
arguments, reversal is required because the provisions are void-for-vagueness as 
applied and on their face. See id. at 36-42; infra Parts III.A-C.  
Moreover, the State appears to agree that Tulley adequately preserved his 
challenge to subsection 76-5-111(1)(q)(i) of the statute, but argues that his 
“vagueness challenge to subsections (1)(q)(iii) and (iv) is unpreserved and should 
be reviewed for plain error.” Aple. Br. 46.  Either way, reversal is warranted 
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under subsections 76-5-111(1)(q)(iii) and (iv) because the vagueness of 
subsections (iii) and (iv) was obvious and prejudicial. See infra Part D. 
A. The provisions are void-for-vagueness as applied. 
As applied in this case, an ordinary person like Tulley would not only be 
uncertain of what “serious physical injury” entails, but also whether the 
circumstances were “likely” to produce such an injury. Moreover, the police, 
prosecutor, and jury were left to subjectively decide whether Larsen’s injuries 
constituted “serious physical injuries” and whether the circumstances were likely 
to produce those injuries. 
Nevertheless, the State argues that Tulley was on notice regarding what 
constitutes “serious physical injury.” See Aple. Br. 52-53. It contends: “the 
statutes [] make plain that bruising, pain, bleeding, bone fractures, or soft tissue 
swelling that either collectively or individually (i) seriously impair a vulnerable 
adult's health; (iii) involved physical torture or caused serious emotional harm to 
a vulnerable adult; or (iv) created a reasonable risk of death amounts to ‘serious 
physical injury.’” Id. at 52. According to the State, “[t]his definition put[] [Tulley] 
on notice that repeatedly punching an elder adult in the face, with or without an 
object, is likely to produce bruising, bleeding, swelling, bone fractures, and 
physical pain.” Id. 
Essentially, the State suggests that because Tulley was provided with notice 
regarding the injuries that qualified as “physical injury,” he likewise had notice of 
the injuries amounting to “serious physical injury.” See id. The problem with the 
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State’s argument is this: the statute does not provide guidance regarding the type 
of injury that elevates mere “physical injury” to the level of “serious physical 
injury.” The statute's use of the word “serious” fails to cure any of the 
uncertainties. “Serious” is used not only in the phrase being defined—“serious 
physical injury”—but also in the definitional provisions “serious[] impair[ment]” 
and “serious emotional harm.” Utah Code § 76-5-111(1)(q)(i) & (iii) (emphasis 
added). A statute provides little guidance when the very word subject to 
definition is included in the definition itself. But the real problem is that the 
definition does not tether the word “serious” to anything concrete or objective. 
See id. It is one thing to link the word “serious” to something objective and 
specific like “permanent disfigurement,” see Utah Code § 76-1-601(11), but it is 
quite another to link the word “serious” to some ambiguous phrase like 
“impair[ment] [to] ... health” or “emotional harm.” Utah Code § 76-5-111(1)(q)(i) 
& (iii). 
Moreover, the definition does not provide any “narrowing context.” United 
States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 306 (2008). Nowhere does it include words like 
“permanent” or “protracted,” which would notify Tulley that impairment is 
serious when the harm is long-term and not temporary. Cf. Utah Code §§ 76-1-
601(11); 76-5-109(f)(ii)(H). Moreover, there are no illustrative examples, as in the 
child abuse statute, that provides guidance. See Utah Code § 76-5-109(f)(ii). And 
contrary to the State’s claim, “the illustrative examples in the definition of 
‘physical injury’” provide no answers. Aple. Br. 54. For instance, there is nothing 
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to explain to would-be defendants that “physical injury” is “serious” when, inter 
alia, it: “creates a permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of 
the function of a bodily member, limb, or organ” or “causes [a person] to cease 
breathing.” Utah Code § 76-5-109(f)(ii)(H)-(I). 
In its discussion of arbitrary enforcement, the State also argues that 
Tulley’s reliance on Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, is misplaced. Aple. 
Br. 55-57. But, many of the vagueness problems at issue in Johnson are likewise 
present here. First, like Johnson, the statute in this case does not provide any 
narrowing context by way of example. See 135 S. Ct. at 2557, 2561. The only non-
vague example of “serious physical injury” is injury “caused by use of a dangerous 
weapon.” Utah Code § 76-5-111(1)(q)(ii). But like the enumerated list of non-
vague examples in Johnson, 135 S. Ct. 2555-56, 2561 (describing burglary, arson, 
extortion, and crimes involving explosives as the “confusing” list of examples), 
the inclusion of injury “caused by use of a dangerous weapon” does not provide a 
useful baseline by which to measure the types of injuries amounting to “serious 
physical injury.” See Utah Code § 76-5-111(1)(q). This is because injury “caused by 
use of a dangerous weapon” only speaks to the means by which an injury is 
inflicted. Id. And if anything, its inclusion suggests that a reader’s task, goes 
beyond evaluating whether certain injuries are sufficiently serious, but also 
entails an examination of the means used. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at  2557  (“the 
inclusion of burglary and extortion among the enumerated offenses preceding the 
residual clause” contributed to its vagueness because their presence suggested 
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the need for a “wide-ranging inquiry” that went “beyond evaluating the chances 
that the physical acts that make up the crime will injure someone”). 
Second, as in Johnson, the statute ties the assessment of risk to an 
indeterminate and abstract standard. See id. at 2557-58. Regardless of the fact 
that the vagueness challenge in Johnson arose in the context of the ACCA's 
“categorical approach,” see Aple. Br. 55-56, at the core of the Supreme Court's 
vagueness concerns was the way in which the statute tied the assessment of risk 
to a “judge-imagined abstraction.” Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2558. That is, it tied the 
assessment of risk to the “ordinary case of the crime,” which was an “‘imaginary 
ideal’” that involved elements that were “‘uncertain both in nature and degree of 
effect.’” Id. at 2561. 
Like the residual clause in Johnson, the statute in this case requires an 
assessment of risk—whether the defendant acted under “circumstances likely to 
produce … serious physical injury”—and ties that assessment of risk to an 
indeterminate and abstract ideal—“serious physical injury.” Compare Utah Code 
§ 76-5-111(2), with Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557-58, 2561. Because “serious 
physical injury” (like Johnson's “judicially-imagined,” “‘ordinary case of the 
crime’”) is “‘uncertain both in nature and degree of effect,’” the statute leaves 
defendants, law enforcement, courts, and juries without a way to measure 
whether the circumstances are “‘likely’” to produce such an injury. See id. 
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B. The provisions are void-for-vagueness on their face. 
Tulley argues that the challenged provisions are also facially vague because 
they create similar uncertainties for all would-be defendants. See Aplt. Br. 39-40. 
The State counters that Tulley may not challenge the statute on its face. Aple. Br. 
49-51. Alternatively, it argues that Tulley’s facial challenge fails on the merits. Id. 
57-59. The State’s arguments are unpersuasive. 
1. Tulley can mount a facial challenge.  
The State’s claim that “Tulley may not challenge that statute as … facially 
invalid” is incorrect. Aple. Br. 51. While it does not appear that a Utah appellate 
court has addressed a post- Johnson vagueness challenge, Tulley’s facial 
challenge is permissible under both Utah case law and Johnson. 
Prior to Johnson, facial challenges for overbreadth and vagueness were 
treated as follows: First, the court would “‘determine whether the enactment 
reache[d] a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct.’” State v. 
Norris, 2007 UT 6, ¶13, 152 P.3d 293 (emphasis omitted). “‘If it d[id] not, then 
the overbreadth challenge [would] fail.’” Id. Next, the court would “‘examine the 
facial vagueness challenge and, assuming the enactment implicate[d] no 
constitutionally protected conduct, [the court would] uphold the challenge only if 
the enactment [wa]s impermissibly vague in all of its applications.’” Id.  In other 
words, if the statute was “clear as applied to a particular complainant,” it “c[ould] 
[not] be considered impermissibly vague in all of its applications and thus 
w[ould] necessarily survive a facial vagueness challenge.” State v. MacGuire, 
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2004 UT 4, ¶12, 84 P.3d 1171. Accordingly, courts would “‘examine the 
complainant's conduct before analyzing other hypothetical applications of the 
law.’” Norris, 2007 UT 6, ¶13. Thus, even prior to Johnson, a defendant could 
succeed on a facial challenge for vagueness if he demonstrated that the statute (1) 
was vague as applied to him and (2) it was vague in all of its applications. See id. 
But in Johnson, the United States Supreme Court backed away from the 
notion that to succeed on a facial challenge, a defendant must demonstrate a 
statute’s vagueness “in all of its applications.” See id.; Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 
2560-61. The Court explained that “although statements in some of [its] opinions 
could be read to suggest otherwise, [its] holdings squarely contradict the theory 
that a vague provision is constitutional merely because there is some conduct that 
clearly falls within the provision's grasp.” Id. The Supreme Court also 
demonstrated a willingness to entertain facial challenges. Without conducting a 
threshold as-applied analysis, the Court concluded that the ACCA’s residual 
clause suffered from “hopeless indeterminacy” and struck the provision as 
facially vague. Id. at 2558, 2563. 
Johnson suggests that when presented with a “hopeless[ly] 
indetermina[te]” statute, courts may strike the statute as facially vague without 
an initial showing that the statute is vague as-applied. See id. And for the reasons 
discussed, see Aplt. Br. 32-40; supra Part III.A; infra Part III.B.2, the definition 
of “serious physical injury” likewise suffers from “hopeless indeterminacy.” 
Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2558. But in any event, this Court may reach Tulley’s facial 
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challenge because Tulley demonstrated that the statute is vague as applied to 
him. Aplt. Br. 36-39; supra Part III.A. Moreover, in considering Tulley’s facial 
challenge, this Court need not require a showing that the statute is vague in all of 
its applications. See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2560-61. It should instead follow 
Johnson and strike the challenged definitions as facially vague even if the Court 
can imagine “some conduct that clearly falls within the provision’s grasp.”  Id. 
2. The provisions are facially vague.  
Contrary to the State’s contentions, the provisions are also vague on their 
face because they suffer from an absence of “minimal guidelines” and 
“standard[s]”. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983); City of 
Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 52 (1999). The "indeterminacy of precisely 
what" amounts to an impairment to a vulnerable adult's health, serious 
emotional harm, a reasonable risk of death, or physical torture leaves too much to 
subjective judgment. Williams, 553 U.S. at 306 ("What renders a statute vague is 
not the possibility that it will sometimes be difficult to determine whether the 
incriminating fact it establishes has been proved; but rather the indeterminacy of 
precisely what that fact is."). Where the meaning of these provisions depend on 
subjective judgment, the statute promotes arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement. See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358; Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557-63. 
Accordingly, the provisions are facially vague. See id.; see also Morales, 527 U.S. 
at 52 (a statute may be found facially invalid where “it fails to establish standards 
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for the police and public that are sufficient to guard against the arbitrary 
deprivation of liberty interest”). 
In its brief, the State itself demonstrates the subjectivity inherent in 
determining what constitutes "serious physical injury" and whether the 
defendant acts under circumstances likely to cause such an injury. Responding to 
Tulley’s hypothetical regarding a person who enables an elder adult's cigarette 
smoking habit, the State asserts that “[t]his situation is outside the statute's 
scope.” Aple. Br. 58. To support its argument, the State does not rely on the plain 
language of the statute; it relies on subjective considerations, including the fact 
that a cigarette provider “is simply engaging in his caretaking responsibilities,” 
and responsibility for the continuation and risks of smoking “lie[] with the elder 
adult.” Id. at 58-59. While one person might agree with these statements, another 
person—for some arbitrary reason—may be inclined to hold a caretaker culpable 
for enabling an injurious habit that creates a “reasonable risk of death.” The State 
also argues that “[n]othing in the statute's plain language seeks to prosecute as 
elder abuse a caregiver's failure to prevent an elder adult from making unhealthy 
decisions for himself.” Aple. Br. 58-59 (emphasis added). But at the same time, 
the plain language is not sufficiently narrow such that the cigarette-provider 
would be excluded from prosecution either. It is this type of “‘standardless sweep 
[that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal 
predilections.’” Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 (alterations is original). 
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While the State points out that Tulley only offers “a single hypothetical to 
demonstrate the statute’s vagueness,” there are many other scenarios where the 
innocent could be trapped. Aple. Br. 58. For instance, what about an elderly 
woman who leaves her adoring husband of 50-years for another man? Under the 
vague terms of the statute, leaving the husband would be a circumstance likely to 
cause him “serious emotional harm,” and her act of leaving would cause him to 
suffer “serious emotional harm.”  
Beyond the hypotheticals, the point is that the statute fails to provide 
minimal guidelines and standards. Words like “serious” and “reasonable”—
without any narrowing context and when tethered to nothing specific—leave too 
much room for subjectivity. The statute, therefore, is “unconstitutionally vague 
on its face because it encourages arbitrary enforcement by failing to describe with 
sufficient particularity” the level of risk and harm that subjects a defendant to 
criminal liability. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 361. 
C. Instructing the jury on the vague provisions was prejudicial. 
The court included the unconstitutionally vague provisions in its 
instructions to the jury; inclusion of the vague provisions prejudiced Tulley.  The 
State disagrees, arguing that “[b]ecause unanimity is not required for each 
variation of ‘serious physical injury,’ [Tulley] cannot demonstrate prejudice by 
showing that any one variations is unconstitutionally vague.” Aple. Br. 62. While 
the State is correct in asserting that “unanimity was not required for any one of 
the variations” of “serious physical injury,” its arguments miss the point. See 
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Aple. Br. 59-61. Regardless of the fact that “unanimity is not required for each 
variation of ‘serious physical injury,’” id. at 62, this Court must reverse if it is not 
confident that the jury unanimously found “serious physical injury” based on a 
constitutional variation (i.e. the dangerous weapon variation). 2 
The unanimity discussions in State v. Johnson and State v. Bair arose in 
the context of assessing whether the respective errors required reversal. 
State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1158–60 (Utah 1991); State v. Bair, 2012 UT 
App 106, ¶¶62-64, 275 P.3d 1050. These cases require reversal when there is an 
error in one of the means that may satisfy a critical element, and the court (due to 
a general verdict) cannot be sure that no juror relied on that means to find the 
element. See id. Under these circumstances, reversal is warranted because the 
court cannot be confident that, but for the error, the jury would have 
unanimously found that critical element. Stated differently, a general verdict 
should only be upheld when the court is convinced that the “jury agreed 
unanimously on … a valid and evidentially supported theory of the elements.” 
Johnson, 821 P.2d at 1159. 
This is consistent with decisions of the United States Supreme Court, 
which have held that “where a provision of the Constitution forbids conviction on 
a particular ground, the constitutional guarantee is violated by a general verdict 
                                                 
2 Because the jury did not need to be unanimous on any one of the four 
means that constituted “serious physical injury,” Tulley had no obligation to 
submit a special verdict form asking the jury to specify which of the four means it 
unanimously agreed upon. Cf. Aple. Br. 62-64. 
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that may have rested on that ground.” Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 53 
(1991); see also, e.g., Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1970); Leary 
v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 31-32 (1969); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 585-
588 (1969); Williams v. State of N. Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 292 (1942); 
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931). The constitutional nature of 
the error—as opposed to the insufficiency of the evidence—is likewise important 
in assessing prejudice under these circumstances. For one, 
Jurors are not generally equipped to determine whether a particular 
theory of conviction submitted to them is contrary to law—whether, 
for example, the action in question is protected by the Constitution . . 
. . When, therefore, jurors have been left the option of relying upon a 
legally inadequate theory, there is no reason to think that their own 
intelligence and expertise will save them from that error. Quite the 
opposite is true, however, when they have been left the option of 
relying upon a factually inadequate theory, since jurors are well 
equipped to analyze the evidence 
Griffin, 502 U.S. at 59 (emphasis in original); United States v. Townsend, 924 
F.2d 1385, 1414 (7th Cir. 1991). 
 For this reason, the sufficiency of the evidence cases the State relies on are 
not applicable to cases like this one that involve constitutional errors. See Aple. 
Br. 62. But more importantly, because of the constitutional nature of the error, 
the burden falls on the State to demonstrate that instructing the jury on the vague 
provisions was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; Tulley does not bear the 
burden of demonstrating, as the State argues, “that all four variations of ‘serious 
physical injury’ are unconstitutionally vague.” Aple. Br. 63. 
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To meet this high burden, the State was required to show beyond a 
reasonable doubt that none of the jurors found “serious physical injury” based on 
one of the unconstitutionally vague provisions.  The State failed to make such a 
showing in its brief. Nor could it. As argued, the broad inclusiveness of 
subsections (1)(q)(i), (iii), and (iv) allowed the jury to find serious physical injury 
under one or all of the vague provisions. Aplt. Br. 41. Moreover, the prosecutor 
argued that serious physical injury could be found under each of these 
subsections. R.1029-32. This only increased the likelihood that at least one juror 
found serious physical injury based on an unconstitutionally vague ground. 
Additionally, given the lack of evidence showing that the golf club, spoon, and 
towel rack were used as dangerous weapons, it is unlikely that the jury 
unanimously found serious physical injury based on the dangerous weapon 
variation alone.3 See Aplt. Br. 41-42. The possibility that one juror’s finding of the 
elements rested upon one of the vague alternatives warrants reversal. E.g., 
Bachellar, 397 U.S. at 570-71; Leary, 395 U.S. at 32; Street, 394 U.S. at 585-588; 
Williams, 317 U.S. at 292; Stromberg, 283 U.S. 359, 368; see also State v. Ice, 
997 P.2d 737, 740-41 (Kan. App. 2000). 
                                                 
3 To clarify, Tulley does not make a stand-alone argument that the evidence 
was “insufficient” to show that he used a dangerous weapon. See Aple. Br. 63-64. 
Thus, he was under no obligation to “marshal the evidence [] supporting the 
[dangerous weapon] variation,” and this Court need not address the State’s 
argument that the “challenge is unpreserved.” Id. Tulley instead argued that 
instruction on the vague provisions was prejudicial because it was unlikely that 
the jury unanimously found serious physical injury based on the dangerous 
weapon variation—the only constitutionally valid variation. 
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D. Tulley preserved his challenge to subsections (1)(q)(iii) and (iv); 
alternatively, he has demonstrated plain error. 
Tulley argues he preserved his vagueness challenge to all of the variations. 
Aplt. Br. 42. Alternatively, this Court may review his challenges for plain error. 
Id. at 42-43. The State does not contend that Tulley’s challenge to subsection 
(1)(q)(i) is unpreserved, however, it argues that Tulley did not preserve his 
challenges to subsections (iii) and (iv). See Aple. Br. 45-49. It maintains that his 
vagueness challenges to these subsections should be reviewed for plain error. Id. 
at 48-49. However, according to the State, Tulley “cannot show plain error 
because the vagueness of the statutes was not ‘obvious.’” Id. at 48. The State’s 
argument is unconvincing. 
First, the vagueness of subsections (1)(q) (iii) and (iv) should have been 
obvious because counsel’s objection to subsection (i) placed the court on notice 
that other portions of the statute were similarly vague. See State v. Eldredge, 773 
P.2d 29, 35 n.8 (Utah 1989) (noting “obviousness requirement poses no rigid and 
insurmountable barrier to review”). Additionally, there were clear indications 
before the trial court that should have rendered the deficiencies in subsections 
(iii) and (iv) apparent. For instance, the definition of “serious physical injury” 
was contained in the same jury instruction (Instruction 35) as the definition of 
“serious bodily injury,” which was defined inter alia as injury that “creates a 
substantial risk of death.”  R.384 (emphasis added). Where the definition of 
“serious bodily injury” provided an objective way to quantify the risk of death, it 
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should have been obvious that the adjacent phrase—“creates a reasonable risk of 
death”—did not provide proper guidance. Id. (emphasis added).  
Instruction 35’s definition of “serious bodily injury” also contained 
“permanent” and “protracted” language. R.384. This likewise made it obvious 
that the definition of “serious physical injury” failed to provide guidance as to 
whether the harm (including emotional harm) must be permanent or whether 
temporary harm was sufficient. And the vagueness of “physical torture” should 
have been plain given the prosecutor’s reliance on clearly arbitrary 
considerations—including the fact that Larsen and Tulley were “very close”—to 
support his argument that Larsen’s injuries involved “physical torture.” R.1029-
30. For these reasons, the unconstitutional vagueness of subsections (iii) and (iv) 
should have been obvious. 
Moreover, instructing the jury on subsections (iii) and (iv) was prejudicial 
in light of the previously-described reasons, which include the broad language of 
these subsections, the prosecutor's reliance on them, and the lack of evidence 
showing that Tulley used a dangerous weapon. See infra Part III.C. Thus, Tulley 
has established plain error with respect to subsections (iii) and (iv).4 
                                                 
4 Should this Court conclude that Tulley did not establish plain error, 
reversal is warranted based on subsection (i) alone. The State did not satisfy its 
burden of showing, beyond a reasonable doubt, that not one juror found "serious 
physical injury" based on the "serious[] impair[ment] to a vulnerable adult's 
health" variation. See infra Part III.C. Nor could the State meet this burden given 
subsection (i)’s inclusive language and the prosecutor’s reliance on it during 
closing argument. Id. Thus, reversal is required based on the unconstitutional 
vagueness of subsection (i) alone. E.g., Bachellar, 397 U.S. at 570-71; Leary, 395 
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IV. The habitual offender statute violates the Utah Constitution’s 
cruel and unusual punishment and double jeopardy clauses.  
 Tulley argues that Utah’s habitual offender statute violates the Utah 
Constitution’s cruel and unusual punishment and double jeopardy clauses as 
applied to third degree felony offenders like Tulley. See Aplt. Br. 43-53. The State 
counters that Tulley did not preserve these claims, and consequently, this Court 
should reject them. See Aple. Br. 67-69. While the State reaches the merits of 
Tulley’s cruel and unusual punishment clause claim, it does not address the 
merits of his double jeopardy claim. Id. at 69-73. For the reasons below, the 
State’s preservation challenges fail. 
First, the State argues—without analysis—that Tulley’s “double jeopardy 
argument fails because it was not raised below.” Id. at 68. The State is mistaken. 
In his Motion Objecting to the Habitual Violent Offender Statute as 
Unconstitutional, Tulley “‘raised [the state double jeopardy issue] to a level of 
consciousness’” such that he gave the “‘trial court an adequate opportunity to 
address it.’” State in Interest of M.J., 2013 UT App 122, ¶23, 302 P.3d 485. In 
fact, Tulley devoted an entire section of his motion to his double jeopardy 
argument, which he asserted under both the federal and state constitutions. See 
R.425-27. For instance, Tulley’s motion included argument that:  
● “Utah’s Habitual Offender Statute impermissibly exposes [Tulley] to 
duplicative sentences in violation of his rights against double jeopardy” 
                                                                                                                                                             
U.S. at 32; Street, 394 U.S. at 585-588; Williams, 317 U.S. at 292; Stromberg, 
283 U.S. 359, 368. 
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● the statute “twice expos[es] a defendant to jeopardy for the same 
offense”  
● “as a matter of state constitutional law, this court may find that Utah’s 
Habitual Violent Offender[] statute violates state double jeopardy 
principles.”  
Id.  
Although it appears that trial counsel inadvertently cited Article I, section 7 
(due process) instead of Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution (double 
jeopardy), “[w]hether a party has properly preserved an argument … [does not] 
turn on the use of magic words or phrases.” In re Baby Girl T., 2012 UT 78, ¶38, 
298 P.3d 1251. Indeed, counsel made double jeopardy arguments and repeatedly 
referenced “double jeopardy,” “state double jeopardy principles,” and even 
incorporated double jeopardy clause language into his motion. See id. at ¶36 (due 
process claim preserved where “[t]he briefing in the district court was infused 
with due process implications, arguments, and cases”). Accordingly, this issue is 
preserved because the “record clearly demonstrates [Tulley’s] argument was 
founded in the” state double jeopardy clause. Id. at ¶33.  
The State next argues that Tulley’s Motion Objecting to the Habitual 
Violent Offender Statute as Unconstitutional did not preserve his state 
constitutional arguments because it was filed “too late to preserve” the issues. 
Aple Br. 68-69. In doing so, the State relies on the briefing deadline set by the 
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trial court with respect to a separate ex post facto argument.5  See id. at 67-69. 
But the January 30, 2015 briefing deadline the State claims that Tulley “missed” 
did not pertain to all sentencing related-motions. Nor did the trial court indicate 
that all state constitutional objections “must be made” prior to this deadline. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 12. Rather, the briefing deadline related narrowly to the discrete 
issues counsel raised at the end of trial. See R.1067 (trial judge explaining that 
that the court and “justice would be better served if [he] had the opportunity to 
be briefed by … [counsel] on that particular issue” (emphasis added)).  
It is also important to note that the court considered and on the day of 
sentencing, granted Tulley’s Motion to Reduce Punishment, which Tulley filed 
after the January 30, 2015 date. R.398-401, 439-40, 1095-1102. This dispels any 
notion that the January 30th date was a hard-and-fast briefing deadline for all 
sentencing-related motions or that the court required resolution of all 
sentencing-related issues prior to AP&P’s completion of the presentence 
investigation report. Cf. Aple. Br. 67-69. 
But the real problem with the State’s argument is that deadline or no 
deadline, the trial judge “chose not to treat” defense counsel’s failure to submit a 
brief prior to the deadline as a waiver of Tulley’s state constitutional claims. State 
v. Matsamas, 808 P.2d 1048, 1053 (Utah 1991) (concluding that issue was 
preserved and Utah R. Crim. Proc. Rule 12 timing requirements were waived 
                                                 
5 At this time, counsel also verbally argued that Tulley’s prior offenses 
should not be used to enhance Tulley’s sentence because “he was not advised that 
the could be used to enhance is penalty in the future.” R.1065-66. 
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where trial court “chose not to treat” untimeliness as a waiver and considered the 
issue); State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 1991). The trial court did not 
express concerns about the timeliness of the motion nor did the judge indicate 
that the timing influenced its preparedness. Cf. State ex rel. E.G., 2008 UT App 
308, *2–3 (trial court did not waive timing requirements where the court 
acknowledged the untimeliness of counsel’s objections).   
Rather, the judge stated on the record that he received the motion. R.1091. 
He indicated that the statutory “enhancements [we]re proper and appropriate.” 
R.1094-95. And then the judge denied the motion, indicating: “Under the 
defendant's motion objecting to the habitual offenders statute as 
unconstitutional, the Court hereby denies that.” R.1094-95. Based on this record, 
it is evident that the trial considered Tulley’s constitutional claims and denied his 
motion based on the merits—not based on the timeliness of the motion. Johnson, 
821 P.2d at 1161 (“Because the trial court addressed the … issue fully and did not 
rely on waiver, we consider the issue on appeal”); State v. Parker, 872 P.2d 1041, 
1044 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (holding that “trial court acted on the merits of motion 
and thus de facto considered it timely”). 
 Recently, in Fort Pierce Indus. Park v. Shakespeare, our supreme court 
rejected a claim that an issue was unpreserved where the “‘court not only had an 
opportunity to rule on the issue … but in fact “did rule on it.”’” 2016 UT 28, ¶13. 
Accordingly, as in Shakespeare, “‘the court's decision to take up’” Tulley’s 
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